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I. INTRODUCTION
The key holding of the United States Supreme Court in Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael1 is that a federal trial judge’s “gatekeeping”
function under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as enunciated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2 applies to all
expert testimony, not just scientific testimony.3 The Court further
ruled that the four factors it identified in Daubert may apply to the
testimony of experts outside of scientific testimony,4 but these reliability factors are not to be regarded as definitive checklists or tests:
“Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively
applies to all experts or in every case.”5 Accordingly, federal judges

* Law Clerk, Justice Major B. Harding, Supreme Court of Florida. B.S., Lehigh
University, 1983; M.B.A., Lehigh University, 1984; J.D., with High Honors, Florida State
University College of Law, 2000.
The Author wishes to thank the members and staff of the Florida State University Law
Review for their assistance with this Note and, in particular, Lou Wright, Office Manager,
for her valuable assistance and dedication to the Law Review.
1. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3. See Kumho, 526 U.S. 141.
4. See id. at 147.
5. Id. at 141.
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are now gatekeepers when it comes to deciding the admissibility of
all expert evidence and, apparently, may utilize whatever reliability
guidelines they choose. Lumping all experts together (be they scientific or nonscientific) under the Daubert regime of reliability, however, has enormous potential for causing considerable chaos in the
federal courts.
Since there is no consistent methodology as to when, where, and
how to employ Daubert factors to nonscientific testimony, the genuine likelihood exists that different federal trial courts in different jurisdictions will resolve similar matters involving the same nonscientific expert testimony in diametrically opposite ways; inconsistent
processes will surely yield inconsistent results. Moreover, trial courts
now have broad latitude as to how to go about their reliability determinations for nonscientific testimony. The applicable abuse-ofdiscretion standard, frequently bolstered by harmless error analysis,
makes the trial court’s reliability determination essentially irreversible. Indeed, it appears that Kumho has left the trial courts and litigants with more questions than answers.
Furthermore, the very nature of nonscientific expert testimony,
which is based on personal experience, observations, skills, training,
etc.—and not on complex scientific principles—makes it more conducive to evaluation by the jury. Accordingly, a strong judicial gatekeeper can come dangerously close to infringing upon the jury’s traditional and constitutional obligation as the sole trier of fact. Nonscientific evidence excluded because of an overzealous application of the
Daubert reliability factors to nonscientific evidence may impede the
jury’s ability to make a fair and just decision. As applied, Kumho
seems to work best with nonscientific expert evidence that has scientific underpinnings (e.g., engineering/product design), while it appears to work least well with nonscientific expert evidence based
purely on experience. Nonetheless, the trial court’s newly assigned
role as gatekeeper for nonscientific expert testimony means more
trial review and undoubtedly more exclusions—leaving the jury with
less information and significantly impacting its responsibility as the
trier of fact.
Accordingly, this Note examines Kumho and the ensuing impact
of the Kumho/Daubert interplay. Initially, Part II briefly examines
the evolution of expert testimony admissibility in federal courts,
prior to Kumho. Next, Part III reviews the Supreme Court’s Kumho
decision itself. Part IV then explores courts’ reliability analysis, as it
applies to nonscientific expert testimony, post-Kumho. Specifically,
this Note assesses three major categories of nonscientific expert testimony: engineering/product design, criminal modus operandi, and
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handwriting analysis.6 Part V illustrates remaining problems and
unanswered questions following Kumho. Finally, Part VI suggests an
alternate methodology for trial courts to employ in considering admissibility of nonscientific expert testimony.
II. BACKGROUND OF EXPERT OPINION IN FEDERAL COURTS
In the past two decades, the use of expert witnesses has skyrocketed.7 Examples of the myriad of experts include police officers,8 accountants,9 bankers,10 lawyers,11 economists,12 landowners,13 mechanics,14 engineers,15 social psychologists,16 experts in drug trafficking,17
real estate appraisers,18 and even experts in Soviet intelligence recruiting practices.19 Notably, however, an expert witness with specialized knowledge need not belong to any legitimate discipline.20
Frye v. United States21 established the common law standard for
determining the admissibility of scientific expert testimony.22 Establishing what has become known as the “general acceptance” test, the
Frye Court held that scientific testimony is inadmissible unless the
expert’s methodology is accepted in the general community of scien6. The Author purposely chose three specific areas of nonscientific expert testimony
that reflect judicial inclination to apply Kumho, and which also illustrate Kumho’s application in both criminal and civil contexts.
7. In a Rand study of California Superior Court trials in the late 1980s, experts appeared in 86% of the trials; and on the average, there were 3.3 experts per trial. See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1118-19, 1120 n.19. Also, experts
testify an estimated 40,000 times annually in civil and criminal cases. See id. at 1231
n.348.
8. See, e.g., Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1348 (6th Cir. 1994).
9. See, e.g., Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183, 186 (7th Cir. 1993).
10. See, e.g., Den Norske Bank AS v. First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 75 F.3d 49, 56 (1st
Cir. 1996).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 1996).
12. See, e.g., Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 1994).
13. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.1, at 613-14
(3d ed. 1991).
14. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1434 (11th Cir. 1997).
15. See, e.g., Roback v. V.I.P. Transp. Inc., 90 F.3d 1207, 1214 (7th Cir. 1996).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 974 F. Supp. 1198, 1199 (C.D. Ill. 1997).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 229 (9th Cir. 1997).
18. See, e.g., FDIC v. Suna Assocs., Inc., 80 F.3d 681, 686 (2d Cir. 1996).
19. See United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1238 (7th Cir. 1979).
20. See, e.g., State v. Briner, 255 N.W.2d 422, 423-24 (Neb. 1977) (retired burglar testified as an expert on the issue of whether items found in defendant’s possession were burglar tools); United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1360 (5th Cir. 1978) (witness who testified that he had smoked marijuana over one thousand times and had developed the ability to distinguish marijuana from various sources, permitted to opine that the marijuana
in question was from Columbia).
21. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
22. Frye involved a murder trial in which the defendant sought to admit the result of
a systolic blood pressure deception test (early polygraph test) as exculpatory evidence. See
id. at 1013. The defense maintained that “conscious deception or falsehood, concealment of
facts, or guilt of crime, accompanied by fear of detection when the person is under examination, raises the systolic blood pressure.” Id.
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tists.23 In 1975, however, Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, which include provisions specific to the admissibility of opinion testimony. In particular, Rule 702 reads, “If scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”24
However, in the seminal case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,25 the Supreme Court held that Rule 702 superseded
the Frye test and explained that a trial judge’s “gatekeeping responsibility” under Rule 702 includes ensuring that “any and all scientific
testimony or evidence submitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”26
In the context of the scientific evidence at issue in Daubert, the Court
set forth a number of specific factors for consideration by district
courts in determining expert testimony reliability: (i) whether the
theory or technique “can be (and has been) tested”;27 (ii) “whether the
theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication”;28 (iii) the theory or technique’s “known or potential rate or error”;29 (iv) whether standards exist that control the theory or technique’s operation;30 and (v) the degree to which the theory or technique has been accepted in the relevant scientific community.31

23. Id. at 1014. Under Frye, judges did not examine the reliability of such testimony,
but rather they looked to the general community of scientists to see if there was substantial agreement that the methodology the expert employed was sound. See id. Finding that
the systolic blood pressure deception test was not accepted in the general community of
scientists, the Frye court did not allow the scientist to testify nor was he allowed to administer the test to Frye in front of the jury. See id.
24. FED. R. EVID. 702.
25. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
26. Id. at 589 (emphasis added). The Daubert Court found the Frye test “rigid” and inconsistent with the “liberal thrust” and permissive backdrop of the Federal Rules. Id. at
588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)). Note, however, that
a number of states retained Frye, fearing that Daubert would place ill-suited responsibilities on lay judges. “[A] courtroom is not a laboratory, and as such it is not the place to conduct scientific experiments. If the scientific community considers a procedure [or process]
unreliable for its own purposes, then the procedure or process must be considered less reliable for courtroom use.” Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993) (citing Stokes v.
State, 548 So. 2d 188, 193-94 (Fla. 1989)). In Florida, for example, “an expert’s opinion
which is based on a scientific principle, theory or methodology is admissible only when the
underlying scientific principle, theory or methodology is generally accepted in the field in
which it belongs.” CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 702.3 (1999).
27. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (noting the importance of scientific methodology in distinguishing science from other types of inquiry).
28. Id. (noting that “submission to the scientific community . . . increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected”).
29. Id. at 594.
30. See id.
31. See id.
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Scientific testimony, however, is only one type of expert testimony
proffered.32 Under Frye, Daubert’s predecessor, most courts took a
laissez-faire attitude toward the reliability of premises underlying
nonscientific expert testimony; any doubts about the reliability of the
expert’s theory went “largely unregarded.”33 In a footnote, the
Daubert Court disclaimed any intention to prescribe admissibility
standards for nonscientific expert testimony.34
The Supreme Court left open significant questions regarding the
admissibility of nonscientific testimony.35 And, in what became a
harbinger of the future uncertainty that Daubert created, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed concerns about the Daubert majority’s interpretation of Rule 702 and its application to other types of testimony.36 He questioned whether Daubert would apply to “technical or
other specialized knowledge,” and if there was a distinction between
this type of testimony and the scientific testimony addressed in the
case.37 Indeed, a conflict ensued among the appellate courts concerning Daubert’s applicability to nonscientific evidence. One group of
courts refused to apply Daubert to nonscientific testimony,38 while
other courts reached the opposite conclusion.39
32. Scientific knowledge is distinguishable from nonscientific evidence by the former’s
susceptibility to validation through hypothesis and testing. Nonscientific evidence, on the
other hand, draws upon the personal knowledge, training, and skills of the expert. See 1
DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1-3.4.1, at 32.
An art historian’s opinion that particular painting is a Cézanne, for example, comprises
technical or other specialized knowledge; she would be applying her knowledge of the Cézanne characteristics that make the paintings unique. See id. On the other hand, an analysis that identifies the painting as a Cézanne based on the time dating of materials used in
the painting would be based on scientific principles such as aging properties of specific materials over time. See id. Likewise, a beekeeper who has observed countless bumblebee
flights would, thanks to his considerable experience, possess specialized knowledge sufficient to enable her to testify that bees always take off into the wind. See Berry v. City of
Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1350 (6th Cir. 1994) (contrasting beekeeper’s nonscientific testimony
regarding bumblebee flight and an aeronautical expert’s scientific testimony, which would
be based upon general scientific principles of aerodynamics).
33. John William Strong, Language and Logic in Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert
Testimony by Restrictions on Function, Reliability, and Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349, 361
(1992).
34. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8.
35. See Jennifer Laser, Note, Inconsistent Gatekeeping in Federal Courts: Application
of Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 30 LOY.
L. REV. 1379, 1381 (1997).
36. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
37. Id.
38. See Stagl v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 117 F.3d 76, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1997) (Daubert did
not apply to experts on human-machine interactions); United States v. Webb, 115 F.3d
711, 713-15 (9th Cir. 1997) (police expert’s testimony not subject to Daubert); United States
v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 230 (9th Cir. 1997) (Daubert only applies to scientific knowledge).
39. See United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1404 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying Daubert
analysis to polygraph examination); Tenbarge v. Ames Taping Tool Sys., Inc., 128 F.3d
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Thus, the questions remained: Does the judge’s gatekeeping role
apply when the expert’s conclusions are not based on a scientific theory or methodology but rather simply on skill-based experience and
training? Does Daubert’s strict criteria apply to an expert opinion involving only technical or other specialized knowledge as well as to
scientific knowledge? What other factors, if any, apply when determining the admissibility of nonscientific evidence? Accordingly, upon
granting the petition for certiorari in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
the Supreme Court sought to clarify the Daubert holding and resolve
conflicting rulings among the circuits.40
III. THE KUMHO ISSUE
On July 6, 1993, the right rear tire of a minivan driven by Patrick
Carmichael blew out on an interstate highway in Alabama, causing
an accident that resulted in the death of one of the van’s passengers
and injuries to several others.41 In October 1993 the Carmichaels
brought a diversity suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama, claiming that the tire, manufactured
by the defendant, Kumho Tire Company (Kumho Tire), failed as a result of a defect.42 In support of their claim that the steel-belted radial
was defective and that the failure did not result from any abuse by
the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs offered the testimony of Dennis Carlson,
Jr., an expert in tire failure analysis.43
It was undisputed that the blowout occurred when the tire’s tread
separated from the remaining tire core. However, Carlson’s visual
observation led him to conclude that this separation was caused by a
defect in the tire rather than by “overdeflection,”44 as the defendants
claimed.45 In particular, Carlson opined that since the tire did not
656, 659 n.4 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying Daubert to mechanical engineer’s testimony); Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1997) (Daubert factors relevant to assessing all expert testimony including testimony involving “economic valuation, advertising,
psychology, or engineering”); Smelser v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 105 F.3d 299, 304-05 (6th
Cir. 1997) (Daubert applicable to proffered testimony of biomechanics expert).
40. 118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998).
41. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142 (1999).
42. See id.
43. See id. Carlson’s qualifications as an expert were not at issue. He had a master’s
degree in mechanical engineering, 10 years of experience with tires while employed by
Michelin America, Inc. and previously testified as a tire failure consultant in other tort
cases. See Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1514, 1518 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
Rather, it was the expert’s methodological application at issue. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at
145.
44. “Overdeflection” results from “underinflating the tire or causing it to carry too
much weight.” Id. at 144.
45. Id. Note that Carlson also accepted certain background facts about the tire’s age
and history: “[it] was made in 1988 and had been installed some time before the Carmichaels bought the used minivan in March 1993;” “the tire’s tread depth, which was 11/32 of
an inch when new, . . . had been worn down to depths that ranged from 3/32 of an inch
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bear at least two of four physical symptoms that he claimed evidenced overdeflection, the separation must have been caused by a
manufacturing defect in the tire.46
Kumho Tire moved the district court to exclude Carlson’s testimony on the grounds that his methodology failed Rule 702’s reliability requirement and the reliability factors set forth in Daubert.47 The
district court agreed with Kumho Tire that it should act as a
Daubert-type reliability “gatekeeper,” even though one might consider Carlson’s testimony as “technical,” rather than “scientific.”48
Accordingly, the court then examined Carlson’s methodology in light
of the Daubert factors.49 In doing so, the court scrutinized Carlson’s
theory—that the tire must have two of the four elements necessary to
show overdeflection—for its “testability,” whether it “has been the
subject of peer review or publication,” the “known or potential rate of
error,” and its “degree of acceptance . . . within the relevant scientific
community.”50 The court found that all of these factors argued
against the reliability of Carlson’s methods and not only granted
Kumho Tire’s motion to exclude the testimony but also its accompanying motion for summary judgment.51
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court, holding that, in Daubert, the Supreme Court had explicitly limited application of the Daubert factors to “scientific” evidence.52 Finding that Carlson’s testimony was based on personal experience and skill and not scientific principles, the Eleventh Circuit

along some parts of the tire, to nothing at all along others”; “the tire tread had at least two
punctures which had been inadequately repaired.” Id. at 143 (citations omitted).
46. See id. at 143-44. These overdeflection factors were: “tread wear on the tire’s
shoulder that is greater than the tread wear along the tire’s center . . . ; signs of a ‘bead
groove’; sidewalls of the tire with physical signs of deterioration such as discoloration . . . ;
[and] marks on the tire’s rim flange.” Id. at 144. Carlson conceded that the tire in question
showed some symptoms of each of these overdeflection factors, including inadequately
filled puncture holes, which can also cause tread separation. See id. at 144. “But in each
instance, he testified that the symptoms were not significant, and he explained why he believed that they did not reveal overdeflection.” Id. at 145.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id. (quoting Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1514, 1520 (S.D.
Ala. 1996)) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94
(1993)).
51. See Carmichael, 923 F. Supp. at 1519-24. Granting the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration, the district court agreed that Daubert should be applied flexibly (i.e., Daubert’s
four factors were simply illustrative and that other factors could argue in favor of admissibility.) However, the district court’s bottom line analysis was that Carlson’s methodology
used in analyzing the data obtained in his visual inspection lacked sufficient indicia of reliability, justifying the exclusion of his testimony. See Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc.,
No. 93-0860-CB-S, Order at 4-5 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
52. See Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1436 (11th Cir. 1997).
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Court of Appeals found that the district court had erred by applying
Daubert to the tire expert’s testimony.53
A. The Supreme Court’s Kumho Opinion
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and held that the gatekeeping obligation of trial judges,
under Daubert, extends to all expert testimony, not merely testimony
that is scientific, and that the Daubert factors for assessing reliability may apply to nonscientific as well as scientific reliability.54
1. Gatekeeping Objective Applies to All Expert Testimony
In holding the judicial gatekeeping function applicable to all expert testimony, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, writing for the majority,55
said that Rule 702 makes no relevant distinction between “scientific”
knowledge and “technical” or “other specialized” knowledge.56 Hence,
the Rule applies its reliability standard to all knowledge that is the
subject of expert testimony—whether scientific, technical, or specialized.57 Nor is the evidentiary rationale underlying Daubert’s gatekeeping obligation limited to scientific knowledge; “[t]he Rules [702
and 703] grant [testimonial] latitude to all experts, not just to ‘scientific’ ones.”58
Finally, and practically speaking, the Court noted the difficulty
judges might have in distinguishing “between ‘scientific’ knowledge
and ‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ knowledge . . . and recognized
that “there is no clear line that divides the one from the others.”59

53. See id. at 1436. The court based its conclusion upon the manner in which the expert reached his opinion:
[I]t seems apparent to us that [the expert’s] testimony is non-scientific. Although [the defendant] is no doubt correct that the laws of physics and chemistry are implicated . . . [the expert] makes no pretense of basing his opinion on
any scientific theory of physics or chemistry. Instead, [the expert] claims that
he can identify telltale markings revealing whether a tire failed because of a
defect . . . [the expert] asserts no knowledge of the physics or chemistry that
might explain why the . . . tire failed. Thus, we conclude that [his] testimony
falls outside the scope of Daubert and that the district court erred as a matter
of law by applying Daubert in this case.
Id.
54. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141.
55. Justice Breyer was by joined by the Chief Justice, and Justices O’Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg.
56. See id. at 147.
57. See id. Justice Breyer suggested that while the Daubert Court only discussed the
reliability standards applicable to scientific knowledge, that was simply because scientific
knowledge was what was at issue in that case. See id.
58. Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592
(1993)) (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 148 (recognizing that disciplines such as engineering rest upon scientific
knowledge).
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Moreover, even if the distinctions were easily made, the Court found
no convincing need to make them.60
2. Daubert’s Reliability Factors Not Limited to Scientific
Testimony
In summing up the trial judge’s “gatekeeping” obligation, the
Court said Daubert requires the trial judge to ensure the reliability
of all expert testimony.61 Recognizing that there are “many different
kinds of experts, and many different kinds of expertise,” the Court
emphasized the importance of examining the particular circumstances of each case to determine whether the factors are reasonable
measures of reliability.62 Daubert “made clear that its list of factors
was meant to be helpful, not definitive.”63 Even so, the Court said
that “some of Daubert’s questions can help to evaluate the reliability
even of experienced-based [or nonscientific] testimony.”64
In sum, Rule 702 doesn’t specifically limit certain kinds of questions to certain kinds of experts:
Life and the legal cases that it generates are too complex to warrant so definitive a match . . . [T]he trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding . . . how to go about determining whether
a particular expert testimony is reliable . . . [and] should consider
the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable
measures of the reliability of [the] expert testimony.65

60. The Court stated:
Experts of all kinds tie observations to conclusions through the use of . . . “general truths derived from . . . specialized experience” . . . [and] the expert’s testimony often will rest “upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to [the
jury’s] own.” The trial judge’s effort to assure that the specialized testimony is
reliable and relevant can help the jury evaluate that foreign experience,
whether the testimony reflects scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.
Id. at 148-49 (citing Hand, Historian and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1901)).
61. See id. at 149 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592). “Daubert’s general principles apply to matters described in Rule 702. . . . [a]nd where such testimony’s factual basis, data,
principles, methods, or their application are called sufficiently into question . . . the trial
judge must determine whether the testimony has ‘a reliable basis in the knowledge and
experience of [the relevant] discipline.’” Id. (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 150.
63. Id. (citing examples of where Daubert factors don’t work—even in scientific contexts).
64. Id. at 151. (citing two examples: the first where it might be appropriate for a trial
judge to ask “how often an engineering expert’s experience-based methodology has produced erroneous results, or whether such a method is generally accepted in the relevant
engineering community;” the second where “at times [it may] be useful to ask even of a
witness whose expertise is based purely on experience, say, a perfume tester able to distinguish among 140 odors at a sniff, whether his preparation is of a kind that others in the
field would recognize as acceptable”).
65. Id. at 151-52.
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Therefore, Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case.66
3. The Court’s Broad Latitude in Deciding How to Test
Expert Reliability
A trial court’s decision about how to determine an expert’s reliability will be afforded the same deference as the trial court’s “ultimate conclusion” regarding reliability (i.e., it will be reviewed only
for an abuse of discretion).67 “[W]hether Daubert’s specific factors are,
or are not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case is a
matter that the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine.”68
Finally, the Court cited efficiency as the principal reason for holding that a trial court’s decision regarding whether or when a special
briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate reliability
(Daubert hearings) will also be reviewed for abuse of discretion.69 Apparently, a trial court need not undertake detailed and expensive
proceedings addressing Daubert-type objections for those experts using methodologies generally recognized as reliable.70
4. Application to the Tire Failure Expert
Even though the specific question of whether the trial judge in
Kumho abused his discretion when he excluded the tire expert’s testimony was not raised by the certiorari petition, the Court went on to
“explain the way in which a trial judge ‘may’ consider Daubert’s fac-

66. It should be noted that the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence
has proposed an amendment to Federal Rule 702. See Advisory Committee’s Note on Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 702, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Fed. R. Civ.
Pro. and Evid.: Request for Comment 122 (August 1998). Under the proposal, Daubert’s
gatekeeping function applies to all expert testimony, nonscientific as well as scientific, and
an expert’s testimony would be admissible only if “1) the testimony is sufficiently based
upon reliable facts or data, 2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and 3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case.” Id.
67. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152-53 (citing General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,
143 (1997) (holding that the standard for appellate review of Daubert decisions admitting
or excluding expert opinion is abuse of discretion)).
68. Id. at 153.
69. See id. at 152-53.
70. The Kumho Court stated:
Otherwise, the trial judge would lack the discretionary authority needed both
to avoid unnecessary “reliability” proceedings in ordinary cases where the reliability of an expert’s methods is properly taken for granted, and to require appropriate proceedings in the unusual or more complex cases where cause for
questioning the expert’s reliability arises.
Id. at 152.
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tors by applying . . . [its holding] to the case at hand.”71 The Court
concluded that the district court had not abused its discretion in excluding Carlson’s expert testimony.72 “The relevant issue,” the Court
said, “was whether [Carlson] could reliably determine the cause of
this tire’s separation” and “not the reasonableness in general of
[Carlson’s] use of a visual and tactile inspection to determine [if]
overdeflection had caused the tire’s tread to separate from [the] . . .
carcass.”73
Indeed, the reliability of Carlson’s conclusion that the tire was defective was called into doubt by his admissions:
The tire in question . . . had traveled far enough so that some of
the tread had been worn bald; it should have been taken out of
service; it had been repaired (inadequately) for punctures; and it
bore some of the very marks that [Carlson] said indicated not a defect, but abuse through overdeflection.74

The Court’s recognition of the condition of the tire underscores the
particularized nature of the Court’s analysis with respect to the reliability of Carlson’s proffered testimony.
Moreover, Carlson’s theory—that absence of at least two of four
specific signs of abuse of deflection indicates a defective tire—was
called into doubt by his assertion that the tire before him had not
been abused, despite some evidence of the presence of the very signs
for which he looked (and two punctures).75 In applying the factors
from Daubert, the Court noted that there was no indication in the record that other experts in the industry used the same test as Carlson, and that there were no references in the record to any articles or
papers that validated the expert’s approach.76 In sum, because the
district court “ultimately based its decision upon Carlson’s failure to

71. Id. at 152. Justice Stevens dissented to this, however, saying, “it is neither fair to
litigants nor good practice for this Court to reach out to decide questions not raised by the
certiorari petition.” Id. at 159 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. See id. at 153.
73. Id. at 154. “The trial court ha[s] to decide whether this particular expert had sufficient specialized knowledge to assist the jurors ‘in deciding the particular issues in the
case.’” Id. at 156-57 (citing 4 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 702.05[1], at 702-33 (Joseph M. McLaughlin et al. eds., 2d ed. 1998)); see also Advisory Committee’s Notes on FED.
R. EVID. 702, supra note 66 (“stressing that district courts must ‘scrutinize’ whether the
‘principles and methods’ employed by an expert ‘have been properly applied to the facts of
the case.’”).
74. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 154.
75. Id. Carlson’s deposition transcripts also cast doubt upon his reliability when he
could not tell “with any certainty” from the tread wear whether a tire had traveled less
than 10,000 or more than 50,000 miles. Id. Yet, the Court derisively commented, he sought
that the district court find reliable his “method of visual and tactile inspection sufficiently
precise to ascertain with some certainty the abuse-related significance of minute shoulder/center relative tread wear differences.” Id. at 155.
76. See id. at 157.
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satisfy either Daubert’s factors or any other set of reasonable reliability criteria,” it did not abuse its discretion.77
IV. POST-KUMHO APPLICATION
In examining cases concerning the admissibility of nonscientific
expert evidence after Kumho, several major observations come to
mind: 1) there is no consistent methodology as to when, where, and
how to employ the Daubert factors to nonscientific testimony; 2)
courts have been loathe to develop other applicable reliability factors
(besides the highly suspect have-courts-admitted-this-type-of-experttestimony-before factor); 3) such inconsistencies have resulted in inconsistent outcomes regarding admissibility of similar nonscientific
expert testimony; 4) appellate courts have shown almost total deference to the trial courts because of the abuse-of-discretion standard
frequently bolstered by harmless error analysis, if necessary;78 and 5)
Kumho seems to work best with nonscientific expert evidence with
scientific underpinnings, such as engineering/product design, while it
appears to work least well with nonscientific, experience-based expert evidence. Accordingly, this Part examines Kumho’s effect on the
admissibility of three significant areas of nonscientific expert testimony: engineering/product design, criminal modus operandi and
handwriting analysis.
A. Engineering/Product Design
In Jaurequi v. Carter Manufacturing Co.,79 the Eighth Circuit
held that the district court properly excluded the proffered expert
testimony of a mechanical engineer and a human factors engineer,
both of whom would have testified that the design and product safety
warnings for a corn-harvesting device were defective.80 In recognizing
Kumho, the court said, “when engineers are brought in to suggest
that a product should have been designed differently, the district
court does not err in looking to Daubert for guidance as to whether
such testimony should be admitted or excluded.”81
77. Id. at 158. In a short but ominous concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, with whom
Justice O’Connor and Justice Thomas joined, cautioned against any lessened vigilance by
the trial courts in their gatekeeping obligation to exclude “expertise that is fausse” and
“science that is junky.” Id. at 159. That is, the court’s discretion is “not discretion to perform the [gatekeeping] function inadequately,” and “failure to apply one or another of [the
Daubert factors] may be unreasonable, and hence an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 158-59.
78. See infra Part V.B. Indeed, this deferential treatment by the appellate courts provides, in many cases, little real insight into the actual application of the Kumho principles.
79. 173 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir. 1999).
80. The plaintiff brought this action against John Deere Company, alleging that design and warning defects associated with a Deere corn head proximately caused an accident in which the plaintiff’s legs were amputated. See id.
81. Id. at 1083.
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Though it is not clear from this opinion to what extent the district
court applied the Daubert factors, the Eighth Circuit applied at least
two of the Daubert factors in affirming the exclusion of the mechanical engineer’s testimony that the corn-harvesting device was unreasonably dangerous because it lacked “awareness barriers.”82 First,
the court addressed Daubert’s “testing” prong: “[The expert] has not
attempted to construct or even draw the suggested device, much less
test its utility as a safety device or its compatibility with the corn
head’s proper function.”83 Second, the court addressed Daubert’s
“general acceptance” prong: “Nor has [the expert] pointed to any
manufacturer that incorporates awareness barriers into corn heads
or similar farming machinery.”84 The court followed that same analysis regarding the testimony concerning the sufficiency of safety warnings on the corn heads, noting that neither engineering expert “had
created or even designed a warning device which would have been
more appropriate, much less tested its effectiveness . . . . [and neither
expert] pointed in their deposition testimony to other manufacturers
of farm machinery who were employing [the proffered] warnings.”85
Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the exclusion of the engineer’s expert testimony.86
In Kinser v. Gehl Co.,87 the Tenth Circuit held that the trial court
should have excluded the testimony of two engineers who testified
that the design of a hay baler was defective.88 In so holding, the court
acknowledged the application of Kumho to nonscientific testimony
and the “flexible and non-exclusive” use of the Daubert factors in
evaluating the reliability of that testimony.89
In this case, the Tenth Circuit appeared to focus exclusively on
Daubert’s “testing” prong in its analysis:90 “[T]esting of alternative
design proposals is often a critical component to the reliability of an
engineer expert witness’ testimony on this subject.”91 The court noted
that most of the proposed design modifications discussed by the experts—for example, that the manufacturer failed to post safety warnings, that the design lacked automatic shut-off capability and a
safety guard—failed to provide an adequate foundation of reliabil82. Id. at 1084.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 1085.
87. 184 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 1999). Kinser was a product liabilities actition brought by
a farmer’s wife against a baler manufacturer when her husband was fatally injured while
baling alfalfa with the defendant’s big round baler. See id. at 1264.
88. See id. at 1271-72. The court concluded, however, that any error was ultimately
harmless, and declined to reverse the district court. See id. at 1271.
89. Id. at 1271.
90. Id. at 1271-72.
91. Id. at 1272.
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ity.92 “Simply throwing out a concept and suggesting it may be feasible is an insufficient basis for relaxing the usual first-hand knowledge requirement of the Federal Rules of Evidence . . . .”93 The Kinser
court noted that the experts acknowledged that their recommended
changes for the baler “were all mere concepts; [they] neither developed designs nor tested the feasibility or safety of any of [their] proposals.”94
In Moisenko v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft,95 the Sixth
Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deciding to exclude the testimony of an expert on the “door closing system” of a passenger van.96 The court recognized Kumho’s applicability to nonscientific testimony and noted that “when an expert posits
an experience-based methodology, some of the Daubert factors can
help to evaluate the reliability of proffered testimony.”97 In Moisenko,
however, because the plaintiff failed to establish any of the factors
set out in Daubert, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that the door latch expert’s testimony was unreliable and,
thus, inadmissible under Rule 702.98
Finally, in Ballard v. Buckley Powder Co.,99 a homeowner proffered the expert testimony of an architectural engineer, who designed foundations to withstand seismic activity, to support her
claim that the defendant caused damage to her home while conducting blasting operations during construction of a nearby highway. Indeed, the court recognized the application of Kumho when determining the reliability of the engineer’s testimony. In this case, however,
the court applied all of the Daubert factors in deciding to exclude the
engineer’s testimony and found that “[n]othing [was] cited to show
that [the expert’s] method or basis for determining causation ha[d]
been tested or subjected to peer review, ha[d] a known or potential
rate of error, or ha[d] attained general acceptance in the field of engineering.”100

92. Id.
93. Id. (citing Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 369 (7th Cir. 1996)).
94. See id. at 1271. Interestingly, the court recognized that this type of testimony (i.e.,
“[t]o propose a design concept or design change without engaging in [a well-recognized
product design] methodology contravenes the engineering code of ethics.”) Id.
95. 198 F.3d 246 (6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision). The unreported opinion
is available in Westlaw. Moisenko v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, No. 98-2202,
1999 WL 1045075 (6th Cir. Nov. 12, 1999).
96. See Moisenko, 1999 WL 1045075, at *1. The plaintiff brought this action against
the van’s manufacturer alleging that the rear door latch of the van malfunctioned during
an accident, resulting in his wife’s death. Id.
97. See id. at *2 (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)).
98. See id. at *3.
99. 60 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (D. Kan. 1999).
100. Id. at 1184.
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So, although it appears that there is no consistent application of
the Daubert factors in assessing the reliability of an engineer’s expert
testimony, courts do seem to be consistently using Daubert as a starting point at least. Moreover, application of Daubert “testing” prong
appears most prevalent in cases involving engineers’ testimony. Accordingly, the Kumho/Daubert combination seems to be a good fit for
evaluating the reliability of engineer’s testimony in the product liability context, most likely because of the scientific underpinnings of
engineering knowledge itself.
B. Criminal Modus Operandi
A number of opinions citing Kumho involve nonscientific expert
testimony concerning the modus operandi of various types of criminals. In United States v. Molina,101 the District Court for the District
of Minnesota permitted the expert testimony of a Minneapolis police
captain concerning “drug trafficking trade such as drug distribution
amounts, the use of guns, the use of aliases, and the use of surveillance partners.”102 The defendant contended that the admission of
such evidence was improper use of expert testimony.103 In finding no
abuse of discretion in the decision to permit the drug trafficking
trade expert’s testimony, however, the Eighth Circuit appeared undaunted by the trial court’s apparent failure to conduct any specific
reliability analysis as required by Daubert/Kumho.104 Rather, the
Eighth Circuit merely cited a previous case that had given the district court “discretion to allow law enforcement officials to testify as
experts concerning the modus operandi of drug dealers . . .” as justification for its finding.105
In addition, the court seemed to confuse a “helpfulness” analysis
pursuant to Rule 702 with the reliability analysis prescribed by Daubert/Kumho.106 In this regard, the court merely recognized that the
drug trafficking expert’s testimony “provide[d] a context for the jury”
and undermined the defendant’s “innocent companion” theory.107 Al101. 172 F.3d 1048 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Corona v. United States, 120
S. Ct. 221 (1999).
102. Id. at 1056.
103. See id. The defendant asserted an “innocent bystander” defense to the conspiracy
to distribute cocaine charge made against her in connection with an arrest of her boyfriend
for distributing cocaine. The prosecutor, however, offered the testimony of Minneapolis Police Captain Rocky Fontana who provided detailed testimony as to how drug dealers routinely conduct their drug transactions with a party. Fontana explained that one person
typically sells the drugs while the other person serves as a surveillance monitor. See id.
104. See id.
105. Id. (citing United States v. Brown, 110 F.3d 605, 610 (8th Cir. 1997)). The Author
refers to this type of justification as the “we’ve-generally-done-it-before” reliability analysis—not quite the “particularized” reliability determination as called for by the Kumho
Court.
106. See id.
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ory.107 Although the court cited Kumho for the proposition that
Daubert applies to all expert testimony,108 no Daubert factors were
employed. Indeed, the court’s analysis was void of any other “reasonable reliability” criteria as urged by Kumho.
In United States v. Romero,109 the Seventh Circuit found no abuse
of discretion when the district court admitted, over the defendant’s
objection, the prosecution’s FBI expert’s testimony concerning the
general traits of child molesters.110 Here, the court cited the flexible
reliability test and the broad latitude the district court enjoys when
determining the reliability of nonscientific evidence.111
Again, however, the court merely cited past cases where the court
had “recognized the value of expert testimony in explaining a complicated criminal methodology” as rationale for admissibility.112 The
court also agreed with the trial court’s decision to admit the testimony “because [the expert’s] testimony was helpful to the jury in understanding how child molesters operate—something with which
most jurors would have little experience.”113 There was no apparent
reliability determination employing the Daubert factors, or any others, by either the trial court or the Seventh Circuit, involving the
particular circumstances of this case. The court only offered the
newly evolving “we’ve-generally-done-it-before” factor to justify finding abuse of discretion.
In United States v. Harris,114 the defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.
At trial, the prosecution sought to offer a police officer’s testimony
“as to the methods of packaging and distributing crack cocaine and
other methods and operations of street level drug dealers.”115 Over
the defendant’s objection that the district court did not properly determine the reliability of the officer’s expert opinion testimony, the
officer was permitted to testify.116 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit cited
Kumho and the broadening of “the Daubert analysis to specifically
include ‘technical’ as well as ‘other specialized knowledge,’ such as

107. Id.
108. See id. at 1056.
109. 189 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1286 (2000).
110. Id. at 582-86.
111. Id. at 584 (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 585.
114. 192 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1999).
115. Id. at 583. The officer’s testimony included the supposition that “a rolled up pant
leg often serves as a signal that a person has drugs for sale, that shoes and socks are common places to hide drugs, and that large pieces of crack are often broken into smaller
pieces and wrapped individually for sale.” Id. The defendant argued that the amount of cocaine found on his person (approximately 5.9 grams) was for his own personal consumption—and not for distribution. See id. at 589.
116. Id. at 583.
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that possessed by [the testifying officer].”117 The court, however,
merely cited to a previous case, which stated that a “police officer[’s]
expert testimony [is] admissible where it will aid the jury’s understanding of an area.”118 Again, although the court cited both Daubert
and Kumho, there was no apparent reliability determination using
Daubert factors or any others pertaining to the circumstances of this
particular case.
In United States v. Matthews,119 a defendant convicted of carjacking argued that the district court violated Daubert/Kumho by allowing a “gang expert” to testify at his sentencing.120 Specifically, the defendant argued that the officer’s “methodology was unreliable, not
subject to peer review, and not generally accepted within the scientific community as Daubert requires.”121 Although the Fifth Circuit
recognized that district court’s gatekeeping responsibility applied to
the officer’s nonscientific testimony, the court missed a perfect opportunity to pass on the applicability of the Daubert factors to nonscientific testimony by invoking not only the Joiner abuse-of-discretion
standard, but also a harmless error analysis.122
In United States v. Hankey,123 the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to apply any
Daubert factors and admitting testimony of a gang expert concerning
gangs’ “code of silence.”124 The prosecution had introduced the testimony of an FBI anti-gang task force member that “gangs enforce a
code of silence among their members [and] that any affiliated gang
member would be subject to violent retribution if one gang member
testified against another.”125 Accordingly, the defendant appealed his
conviction on grounds that the district court “failed to properly discharge its gatekeeping function” and abused its discretion in admitting the gang expert’s testimony.126

117. Id. at 589 (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)).
118. Id. (citing United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 676, 681 (6th Cir. 1996)).
119. 178 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 359 (1999).
120. See id. at 303. An officer of the San Antonio Police Department’s gang investigation unit “testified at [the defendant’s] sentencing hearing concerning the Crip gang’s influence, gang leadership, gang terminology and tattoos, and a gang database kept by the
department.” Id. He identified the defendant “as a gang member and testified [that the defendant] was documented as a gang member in the database about six times.” Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 304 (citing Unites States v. Griffith, 118 F.3d 318, 323 (5th Cir. 1997)).
Accordingly, the court held: “We need not determine the effects of Daubert on non-scientific
testimony at sentencing in light of . . . Kumho Tire Co. . . . because the remaining nonexpert evidence of Matthews’ gang-related activities at sentencing is sufficient to support
. . . enhancement.” Id.
123. 203 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2733 (2000).
124. See id. at 1167.
125. See id. at 1165. The prosecution offered this testimony to rebut the co-defendant’s
testimony that the defendant was not involved in the PCP transactions.
126. See id. at 1166.
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In rejecting the defendant’s argument, the Ninth Circuit recognized Kumho, emphasizing that “judges are entitled to broad discretion when discharging their gatekeeping function.”127 Here, however,
the court specifically noted that the Daubert factors were inapplicable to nonscientific testimony, as the expert’s testimony was simply
based on his communication with gang members and officers.128 Notwithstanding Daubert’s inapplicability, the Ninth Circuit lauded the
district court’s “diligent” gatekeeping role and its extensive voir dire
of the expert prior to admitting the expert’s testimony.129
The U.S. Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, however, applied
two Daubert factors in determining the reliability of an “exhibitionism” expert witness.130 Citing Daubert and Kumho, the court also acknowledged the general frustration that trial courts seem to be having:
Neither the Supreme Court nor our superior court assigned a
value to any of the Daubert factors, which the military judge must
weigh and balance when performing the gatekeeper function of the
admissibility . . . of expert opinion evidence. This factor notwithstanding, we believe a critical reading of Daubert and its progeny
reflects that the existence or ability of peer review of and the
availability to duplicate the science or methodology in question in
order to ascertain an error rate is critical to a determination of
admissibility.131

In this case, the expert “candidly admitted there was no underlying reliable support for the proffered evidence.”132 In its opinion, however, the court seemed to reject the expert’s testimony more on the
basis that it was “not generally accepted.”133 Accordingly, the court
found that the military judge did not abuse his discretion in limiting
the testimony defendant’s expert witness’ testimony.134
Unlike the arguably consistent use of the Daubert factors in assessing the reliability of engineer’s testimony in a product design
context, assessment of the reliability of criminal modus operandi ex127. See id. at 1167.
128. See id. at 1169.
129. See id. at 1168-69. In particular, the court noted the number of years the expert
had been employed as a police officer, the number of years the expert had been working
undercover with gang members, the amount of formal training received in gang structure
and organization, and the fact that the expert taught classes about gangs, all as factors
contributing to the gang expert’s reliability. See id.
130. See United States v. Huberty, 50 M.J. 704, 710-11 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1999),
aff’d, 53 M.J. 369 (C.A.A.F. 2000). The expert relied on results of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI-2) to determine that it was “unlikely [the defendant was]
an exhibitionist.” Id. at 709.
131. Id. at 710. (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 590-93 (1993)) (emphasis added).
132. Id.
133. Id. The expert was unable to cite any specific cases or studies where the MMPI-2
was used to conclude that one is not an exhibitionist. See id.
134. Id. at 711. (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142 (1999)).
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perts is almost totally void of reliability analysis employing any of
the Daubert factors. In these types of cases, the trial courts appear to
employ precedent, or past admissions of similar testimony, as the key
reliability factor. This, however, contravenes the Kumho requirement
of a particularized reliability determination, one based on the facts of
the particular case. Moreover, the significant deference afforded the
trial court by Kumho as to how the court conducts its reliability determination (often coupled with harmless error analysis), virtually
insulates the trial judge’s reliability determination from reversal.
C. Handwriting Analysis
At least two circuit courts have dealt with the admissibility of expert testimony regarding handwriting analysis following Kumho.135
In United States v. Paul,136 the Eleventh Circuit considered the admissibility of testimony from both an FBI document examiner and a
law professor concerning a demand note written by an alleged extortionist.137 The FBI document examiner compared the handwriting on
the note and the envelope to the defendant’s handwriting samples
and concluded that the defendant was the author of both.138 After
conviction, the defendant argued that the district court abused its
discretion in admitting FBI handwriting analysis expert’s testimony
because “his handwriting analysis failed to meet the reliability requirements of Daubert.”139 In recognizing Kumho, the court noted
“that Daubert’s ‘gatekeeping’ obligation . . . applies . . . to all expert

135. Just as this Part analyzes admissibility of handwriting identification evidence in
the post-Kumho period, at least one author addressed the same subject in the post-Daubert
context. See Andre A. Moenssens, Handwriting Identification Evidence in the Post-Daubert
World, 66 UMKC L. REV. 251 (1997).
136. 175 F.3d 906 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 535 (1999).
137. The extortion note directed a bank branch manager to deliver $100,000 to the
men’s restroom of a downtown Atlanta McDonald’s restaurant. See id. at 908.
138. See id. at 909. The court described the examiner’s enquiry:
Specifically, [the FBI document examiner] asked [the defendant] to write the
word restaurant. In the presence of a FBI agent, [the defendant] misspelled the
word as follows: ‘resturant’. In the extortion note the extortionist misspelled
the word restaurant the same way. [The FBI examiner] also asked [the defendant] to write out ‘Spearman’ [the bank manager’s name]. “[The defendant]
spelled it ‘Sperman,’ the same way the extortionist had addressed the envelope.
Id.
139. Id. The opinion states:
[The defendant] ha[d] not challenged . . . [the FBI expert’s] qualifications as an
expert on handwriting analysis. . . .[A]t the time of the trial, [the FBI expert]:
(1) was a full-time handwriting examiner for 30 years; (2) was a member of four
professional handwriting analysis organizations; (3) established both the Secret
Service’s and the Naval Investigative Service’s “questioned document” laboratories; (4) lectured and taught extensively in the field of handwriting analysis;
and (5) trained new “questioned document” examiners for several law enforcement organizations.
Id.
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testimony. . . . [T]he test of reliability is a ‘flexible’ one, and Daubert’s
list of specific factors neither necessarily nor solely applies to all experts in every case.”140
It is not clear from the opinion, however, what kind of reliability
analysis—if any—the district court engaged in prior to denying the
defendant’s motion to exclude the handwriting expert’s testimony.
Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit refuted the defendant’s primary
argument—that handwriting analysis is not reliable evidence—by
stating in a footnote, “Courts have long received handwriting analysis testimony as admissible evidence.”141 Missing, however, is any requirement to apply any Daubert factors (or any others) when considering the admissibility of handwriting analysis expert testimony.
Moreover, the court seemed to give short shrift to Kumho’s requirement for a “particularized” reliability determination—seeming to
base reliability of this handwriting expert’s testimony solely on the
basis that it has been admitted in the past.
In perhaps the more useful part of the opinion, the court explained why the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the defendant’s rebuttal handwriting analysis expert.142 The court
implicitly identified several factors that a court might consider in examining the reliability of a handwriting expert: 1) the “currency” of
research or writing done on the subject of handwriting analysis;143 2)
the amount of formal training;144 3) the amount of relevant work experience;145 and 4) the expert’s membership in related professional
organizations.146 In excluding the defendant’s proffered expert, the
court said, “His skill, experience, training and education as a lawyer
did not make him any more qualified to testify as an expert on
handwriting analysis than a lay person who read the same articles.”147

140. Id. at 910 (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)).
141. Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1160-61 (6th Cir. 1997) (admitting a handwriting expert’s testimony to show that signatures on numerous documents
were defendant’s); United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 848-50 (3d Cir. 1995) (admitting handwriting expert witness testimony)).
142. See Paul, 175 F.3d at 912. The defendant’s expert was an evidence professor who
“coauthored a law review article critical of forensic document examiners ability to reach
the correct conclusion in questioned document examinations.” Id.
143. The law professor “had done virtually no further research or writing on the subject of the reliability of handwriting expertise since the University of Pennsylvania published his law review article [seven years earlier].” Id.
144. The law professor “had received no formal training in the field [and] had never attended seminars on handwriting analysis.” Id.
145. The law professor “had never worked in a questioned documents laboratory.” Id.
146. The law professor “was not a member of any professional organizations in the
field.” Id.
147. Id.
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In United States v. Battle,148 a defendant convicted of conspiring to
distribute crack cocaine argued on appeal that the district court
erred in admitting the testimony of an expert document examiner.149
The expert compared a signature appearing on a money transfer
with examples of the defendant’s signature, “and then testified, in effect, that, in his opinion, [the defendant] had offered the signature
. . . on the Western Union Transfer.”150 The Tenth Circuit recognized
that in Kumho “the Supreme Court held that Daubert applied not
only to ‘scientific’ testimony, but to all expert testimony.”151 But in
holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert’s testimony,152 the Tenth Circuit provided little guidance in applying the Daubert factors to handwriting analysis: “Our
study of the record on appeal convinces us that [the experts] proffered testimony met the reliability and relevancy test of Daubert.”153
Moreover, the court gave further support to the trial court’s broad
latitude to exclude expert testimony, by saying that “any error . . . [in
the admission of the expert’s testimony] is harmless error.”154
Judge Gertner’s United States v. Hines opinion remains by far the
most enlightening post-Kumho opinion regarding the admissibility of
handwriting analysis experts.155 In Hines, the defendant was charged
for allegedly robbing a bank in Chelsea, Massachusetts, and the government’s principle evidence consisted of the handwriting analysis of
the robbery note.156 In particular, the government offered the testimony of an FBI document examiner to testify as to the authorship of
a “stick-up” note found at the scene of the crime.157 The defendant
sought to exclude the testimony because it failed to meet the
Daubert/Kumho standards.158 In the alternative, had the court allowed the FBI document examiner’s testimony, the defendant sought

148. 188 F.3d 599 (10th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
602 (1999). The unreported opinion is available in Westlaw. United States v. Battle, No.
98-3246, 1999 WL 596966 (10th Cir. Aug. 6, 1999).
149. See Battle, 1999 WL 596966, at **1. The document examiner was employed by the
Kansas Bureau of Investigation for 23 years, including 12 years as a document examiner.
See id. at **3.
150. Id. at **3. The name on the money transfer was different (Anthony Jenkins) from
the defendant’s name (Shawn Battle). See id.
151. Id. at **4 (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)).
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 63 (D. Mass. 1999). Judge Gertner drafted this opinion after
the first trial in this matter resulted in a hung jury. See id.
156. See id. at 63. In addition, the government’s evidence consisted of the eyewitness
identification of the teller who was robbed. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
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to have his own expert testify as to the weaknesses of the FBI expert’s methodology and the basis of the expert’s conclusions.159
The district court, however, denied the defendant’s motion to exclude the handwriting expert’s entire testimony but did not permit
the handwriting expert to make any ultimate conclusions on the actual authorship of the questioned writing.160 The court first identified
handwriting analysis as “an ‘old’ field, . . . which has been the subject
of expert testimony for countless years.”161 Calling handwriting
analysis “the prototype of a technical field regularly admitted into
evidence,” Judge Gertner commented that if he were to “give special
emphasis to ‘general acceptance’ or treat Daubert/Kumho as calling
for a rigorous analysis of only new technical fields, not traditional
ones, then handwriting analysis would largely pass muster.”162
“But,” Judge Gertner continued, “if I were to apply the Daubert/Kumho standards rigorously, looking for such things as
empirical testing, rate of error, etc., the testimony would have serious problems”:163
[Handwriting analysis] has never been subject to meaningful reliability or validity testing, comparing the results of the handwriting examiners’ conclusions with actual outcomes.164 There is no
peer review by a “competitive, unbiased community of practitioners and academics.”165 To the extent that it has been “generally
accepted,” it is not by a “financially disinterested independent
community, like an academic community,” only other handwriting
analysts have weighed in. It has never been shown to be more reliable than the results obtained by lay people.166

Judge Gertner differentiated the two “parts” of the expert’s proffered testimony.167 “Part 1” was the FBI documents examiner’s expert

159. See id.
160. See id. at 63-64. “As a result of this ruling, counsel for [the defendant] made the
strategic decision not to call [its expert, the evidence professor] to critique handwriting
analysis at trial.” Id. at 64.
161. Id. at 63.
162. Id. at 68 (citing D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for
Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting ‘Expertise,’ 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 76471 (1989) (stating the validity of handwriting analysis has been assumed in Dean Wigmore’s treatises, and virtually every standard evidence treatise since that point)).
163. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 68 (citing United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp.
1027, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that if the court had to apply Daubert to handwriting
testimony, it would have been excluded)).
164. Id. (citing Risinger et al., supra note 160, at 736). Indeed, Judge Gertner here relies heavily on Mark P. Denbeaux (the ubiquitous evidence professor and co-author, along
with Risinger and Saks, supra note 160), recognizing that Denbeaux’s testimony was cited
in United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 852 (3d Cir. 1995). See Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d at
68 n.15.
165. Id. at 68 (quoting Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. at 1038)).
166. Id. (citation omitted).
167. See id. at 67.
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testimony with respect to the similarities between the defendant’s
known handwriting and the handwriting observed in the robbery
note.168 “Part 2” was the expert’s conclusive testimony that the defendant did, in fact, author the robbery note.169
Regarding Part 1, Judge Gertner recognized that since the jury
could understand and evaluate the FBI expert’s account of what was
similar or dissimilar in the defendant’s handwriting and the handwriting in the robbery note, and because the witness could be crossexamined about the consequences of the differences, “the jur[ors]
[could] draw their own conclusions.”170 Accordingly, the court concluded that the FBI expert “could testify to the ways in which she . . .
found [the defendant’s] known handwriting similar to or dissimilar
from the handwriting of the robbery note.”171
But with regard to Part 2, the court was not so flexible in its application of the Daubert factors, and seemed to establish a higher
standard when the expert is testifying as to a conclusive issue.172
Specifically, the court says:
There is no data that suggests that handwriting analysts can say,
like DNA experts, that this person is “the” author of the document.
There are no meaningful, and accepted validity studies in the field.
No one has shown me [the expert’s] error rate, the times she has
been right, and the times she has been wrong. There is no academic field known as handwriting analysis. This is a “field” that
has little efficacy outside of a courtroom. There are no peer reviews
of it. Nor can one compare the opinion reached by an examiner
with a standard protocol subject to validity testing, since there are
no recognized standards. There is no agreement as to how many
similarities it takes to declare a match, or how many differences it
takes to rule it out.173

Thus, according to Judge Gertner, “one thing is clear: when [the expert] says, ‘I conclude that [the defendant] wrote the robbery note,’
she may well be going beyond her expertise.”174
Notwithstanding Judge Gertner’s opinion in Hines, there appears
to be no consistent application of the Daubert (or any other) factors in
assessing the reliability of handwriting expert testimony in the wake
of Kumho. Interestingly, however, it does appear that Kumho has
caused courts to re-examine the admissibility of traditionally admissible nonscientific evidence, such as handwriting analysis. In response, courts have fashioned unique admissibility remedies—as
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 70.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 69.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 70.
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seen in the Hines approach: similarity testimony, permissible; conclusory testimony, impermissible. In the end, it appears that Kumho
has injected uncertainty into a previously stable area of law.
V. QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS AFTER KUMHO
In Kumho, Justice Breyer purportedly clarified the Supreme
Court’s view as to how Daubert applies to nonscientific expert testimony. Specifically, the Court held that Daubert’s general gatekeeping obligation applies not only to testimony based on scientific
knowledge, but also to testimony based on technical and other specialized knowledge.175 The Court further stated that trial courts may
consider one or more of the Daubert factors if doing so will help determine that testimony’s reliability; but the test of reliability is flexible, and Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case.176 Also, the district
court has broad latitude in determining reliability.177 Seemingly increased judicial responsibility and discretion do provide flexibility for
the trial judge regarding the admission of nonscientific testimony—
but at what cost?
A. “Flexible” Evaluation: A Breeding Ground for Inconsistency
If you crave definitive tests and checklists, Kumho is a disappointment. Kumho leaves it to the district court to determine what
factors are relevant in assessing the reliability of nonscientific expert
testimony in a particular case.178 The major problem with the Kumho
decision, however, is that it offers little guidance for district courts to
use in exercising their newly granted gatekeeping powers for nonscientific expert testimony. More judicial discretion would seem to account for more uncertainty for litigants and certainly more “wiggle
room” for overzealous advocates.
The Author contacted two recognized experts in the field of handwriting analysis, and both identified unpredictability as the primary
175. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See supra Part III.A.3. The Kumho Court gave an example of how this flexible application of Daubert might open the door for the admissibility of novel, yet well-founded,
expert analysis:
It might not be surprising in a particular case, for example, that a claim made
by a scientific witness has never been the subject of peer review, for the particular application at issue may never previously have interested any scientist.
Nor, on the other hand, does the presence of Daubert’s general acceptance factor help show that an expert’s testimony is reliable where the discipline itself
lacks reliability, as, for example, do theories grounded in any so-called generally accepted principles of astrology or necromancy.
Kumho, 526 U.S. at 151.
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fallout of Kumho.179 The lack of an objective standard for applying
the Daubert factors (or other reasonable reliability criteria) defies the
law’s basic goal—to make the outcome of a Daubert hearing more
predictable. Inconsistent processes will undoubtedly yield inconsistent results.180
B. Unbridled “Discretion”?
Kumho grants district courts the same broad latitude in how the
courts make reliability determinations as it grants with respect to
the district courts’ ultimate admissibility determination (i.e., abuse of
discretion).181 But this deferential standard, often compounded by
harmless error analysis, makes trial decisions on the admissibility of
nonscientific expert testimony virtually unreviewable.182 Absent total
disregard of the reliability determination, under Kumho, a trial court
will rarely suffer reversal for abuse of discretion. Moreover, this
standard will do little toward further clarifying proper application by
appellate courts of the Daubert—or any other—factors to nonscientific expert testimony, particularly if the appellate courts choose to
“pass” on reviewing the trial court’s decision by making a “harmless
error” determination and/or finding no abuse of discretion. What is
most unfortunate, however, is that this standard will likely promulgate a variety of processes and results, which could possibly concern
admissibility of the very same expert witness’ testimony.183

179. Telephone Interviews with Farrell Shiver and Tom Vastrick, both Certified Forensic Document Examiners (Nov. 19-21, 1999). Aside from acknowledging a new uncertainty in whether their testimony would be admissible—depending on the court considering the admissibility of such testimony—both experts also acknowledged a need to go to
court more often to defend the handwriting analysis profession, despite that such testimony has traditionally been admissible for a “long, long time.” Id.
180. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia cautions the district courts against abusing
their newfound flexibility in choosing the manner of testing expert reliability. See Kumho,
526 U.S. at 158-59 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he discretion [the Court] endorses . . . is not
discretion to abandon the gatekeeping function . . . [and] it is not discretion to perform the
function inadequately.”).
181. See Kumho, 526 U.S. 142 (citing General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143
(1997) (stating that courts of appeals are to apply the abuse-of-discretion standard when
reviewing the district court’s reliability determination)).
182. Kumho gives the trial court the discretion to short circuit many expert evidentiary
objections in “run-of-the-mill” litigation by its express invitation to trial courts to take judicial notice of the reliability of well-established methodologies in appropriate circumstances.
See id. at 152.
183. Finally, in the wake of Daubert/Kumho:
[M]otions to preclude expert testimony have become something of a cottage industry. . . . So-called Daubert motions have had the unintended negative side
effect of encouraging costly satellite litigation and delaying the ultimate resolution of the case on the merits. That trend is likely to continue until the courts
take steps to restore the balance between admissibility and reliability that
Daubert advocated. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Kumho Tire missed
an opportunity to do so.
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C. “Gatekeeping” or “Goaltending”?
Overly restrictive gatekeeping, however, may be selling the jurors’
abilities short and depriving juries of valuable information that could
help to reach a correct verdict. This is particularly true with regard
to nonscientific expert testimony, which, by its very nature, is purely
experience-based and not based on abstract scientific principles. Unlike scientific expert knowledge, the reliability of nonscientific
knowledge is not validated by external testing, but rather by considering the soundness of the methodology and principles on which the
testimony is based—a task that the jury is just as qualified as the
trial judge to conduct.184 Judges are laypersons as well, and there is
no inherent reason to believe that the layperson on the bench is more
competent at dealing with nonscientific issues than the laypersons in
the jury box.185
Furthermore, by applying arbitrary and inconsistent factors to determine the admissibility of nonscientific expert testimony, the trial
judge may be keeping evidence from the jury and ultimately infringing upon a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial.186
The primary reason for recognizing a defendant’s right to a jury trial
is to protect against “the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge”:187
[T]he jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions
reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official
power—a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and
liberty of the citizen to one judge . . . . The deep commitment of the
Nation to the right of jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement qualifies for protection
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
. . . .188

Edward D. Cavanagh, Decision Extends Daubert Approach to All Expert Testimony, 71
N.Y. ST. B.J. 9, 20 (Aug. 1999).
184. Although several of the arguments in this section might apply to all experts, the
Author is not, by any means, advocating the abdication of the judge’s role as gatekeeper for
expert testimony that relies on scientific principle, test or methodology. Scientific knowledge is difficult, if not impossible for the juror to evaluate. Moreover, scientific knowledge,
by its very nature implies an infallibility not found in pure opinion testimony, and thus
carries with it the tremendous potential to conclusively persuade a jury.
185. In 1968, the Supreme Court said:
[J]uries do understand the evidence and come to sound conclusions in most of
the cases presented to them and [] when juries differ with the result at which
the judge would have arrived, it is usually because they are serving some of the
very purposes for which they were created and for which they are now employed.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968).
186. In Duncan, 391 U.S at 157-58, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees a right to jury trial in all serious criminal
cases.
187. Id. at 156.
188. Id. (emphasis added).
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Accordingly, the right to a jury trial in criminal cases, where the defendant’s life and liberty are in the balance, is too fundamentally important to risk the arbitrary and inconsistent exclusion of potentially
valuable expert testimony from the ears of the jury.
Moreover, any unduly rigorous exercise of the judges’ gatekeeping
function “would inexorably lead to evaluating witness credibility and
weight of the evidence, the ageless role of the jury.”189 Judicial gatekeeping should not prevent the jury from hearing expert testimony;
rather, judges should focus on assisting the jury in carrying out its
constitutional duty:
It is the jury, not the court, which is the fact-finding body.190 It
weighs the contradictory evidence and inferences, judges the
credibility of witnesses, receives expert instructions, and draws the
ultimate conclusion as to the facts. . . . [I]ts function is to select
from among conflicting inferences and conclusions that which it
considers most reasonable. That conclusion, whether it relates to
negligence, causation or any other factual matter, cannot be ignored.191

The newly assumed role as gatekeeper for nonscientific expert testimony means more trial review and undoubtedly more exclusions,
leaving the jury with less information and significantly impacting
the jury’s responsibility as the trier of fact. The trial court’s gatekeeping function should not expand the trial judge’s role, but rather
assist the jury in fulfilling its responsibility.192
VI. ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS FOR THE TRIAL JUDGE
Given the overall dearth of guidance Kumho provided to trial
judges, the district court should make the reliability and admissibility determination of nonscientific expert testimony with a full range
of options in mind. Otherwise, the court might exclude evidence that
should have been admitted. Accordingly, the following approach pro189. McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1045 (2d Cir. 1995) (declining to “elevate [trial judges] to the role of St. Peter at the gates of [H]eaven, performing a searching
inquiry into the depth of an expert witness’s soul—separating the saved from the
damned”).
190. The Constitution provides:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, then according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
191. Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944).
192. The Author notes one benefit of a strong judicial gatekeeper: It might lessen the
“battle of the experts”. For example, if the district court in Kumho had allowed Carlson’s
testimony, Kumho Tire surely would have countered with its own expert to refute Carlson.
This, however, seems hardly a justifiable reason to keep valuable evidence from a jury—
whose responsibility as fact-finder is constitutionally mandated.

892

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:865

vides a structured analysis for the trial court to apply in determining
reliability of nonscientific expert testimony, while safeguarding the
constitutional right to trial by jury.
First, if the proffered nonscientific expert testimony concerns a
conclusive issue in the case (e.g., matching one handwriting sample
to another), then a stricter set of reliability standards should apply,
starting with each of the four Daubert factors. Second, the trial court
should be required to record its findings and, if necessary, explain
why any of the Daubert factors do not apply to the particular expert.193 Moreover, if the trial judge decides to depart from Daubert, he
should be required to articulate reasons for adopting the new
reliability tests used.194 This approach seems consistent with Justice
Scalia’s concurring opinion in Kumho, where he indicated that it
might indeed amount to an abuse of discretion if the trial court fails
“to apply one or another of [the Daubert factors].”195
But where testimony is such that the jury will be left to make the
ultimate conclusion (e.g., the expert is only comparing handwriting
samples and pointing out similarities and differences), the trial court
should employ a less rigorous gatekeeping function. Also, under this
scenario relevant testimony from a qualified nonscientific expert
should be presumptively admissible when the expert does not draw
explicit conclusions regarding the facts at issue, unless the opponent
comes forward with substantial evidence that the expert’s opinion is
mere speculation or subjective belief.196 A presumption of admissibility is consistent with the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of Evidence and would minimize abuse.197
Practically speaking, requiring a district court to conduct a reliability inquiry whenever a party utters a Daubert/Kumho objection
to a proposed expert invites abuse. A full-scale Daubert/Kumho
hearing can be an expensive proposition, requiring additional court
time, transportation of the testifying expert, supporting documentation and, possibly, supporting experts. A party should not be permitted to force an opponent into a disadvantageous settlement, or to deter individuals from pursuing their legal rights in the first place, by
imposing unnecessary expense absent evidence of genuine reliability

193. The Author notes that the trial judge may, at this point, want to appoint an expert under FED. R. EVID. 706 to enhance the court’s ability to reach a correct reliability determination.
194. The Fifth Circuit advanced this approach in Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d
308, 312 (5th Cir. 1999).
195. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 159 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring).
196. See Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78
MINN. L. REV. 1345, 1367 (1994).
197. In Daubert, the Court recognized “the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules and
their ‘general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to ‘opinion’ testimony.’” 509 U.S.
at 588, (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).

2000]

KUMHO TIRE CO. V. CARMICHAEL

893

concerns. Having a presumption of admissibility would require the
opponent to come forward with specific evidence challenging the reliability of the proffered expert.198
Here, as previously discussed, other mechanisms, such as crossexamination, rebuttal testimony, jury instructions, and note taking,199 would provide a sufficient check on the reliability of the nonscientific expert testimony—without risking the danger of excluding
useful evidence from the jury. Cross-examination, in particular, can
be a vitally important means of ensuring reliability of nonscientific
expert testimony, where the witness typically relies on her own personal knowledge and experience, rather than on scientific theories
not discernable in the courtroom.200 Indeed, the Daubert Court recognized that “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”201 Moreover, the Hines court noted that cross-examination
and limiting instructions are more effective in nonscientific fields because “they are more accessible to the jury, than fields with the charisma of science.”202
Other potential remedies for a court dealing with questionable
nonscientific expert testimony include: appropriate jury instructions
regarding the use of the expert’s testimony;203 a directed verdict un198. Note that the adversarial approach would likely benefit the judge and permit him,
ultimately, to make a more informed gatekeeping determination.
199. See generally Sandra Day O’Connor, Juries: They May Be Broke, but We Can Fix
Them, FED. LAW., June 1997, at 20, 23-24; Development in the Law: The Civil Jury, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1503-11 (1997).
200. In Kumho, objections that Carlson’s expert opinion was unreliable did not focus on
the underlying principle that causes of tire failure can be ascertained by visual inspection,
but rather on Carlson’s application of that principle, which could have been probed
through cross-examination and rebuttal. For example, opposing counsel could have highlighted to the jury the dismal condition of the tire in question (i.e., severely worn tread,
improperly repaired punctures, etc.) and, as such, lead them to draw their own conclusion
regarding the reliability of Carlson’s testimony. See Kuhmo, 526 U.S. 137, 141-45 (1999).
201. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
202. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 67. The Eighth Circuit also recognized the value of vigorous cross-examination of the nonscientific expert in refusing to find that the district court
abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of an accountant. See Forklifts of St.
Louis, Inc. v. Komatsu Forklift, U.S.A., Inc., 178 F.3d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir. 1999); see also
Newell Puerto Rico, Ltd. v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 20 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting International Adhesive Coating Co. v. Bolton Emerson Int’l, Inc., 851 F.2d 540, 544 (1st Cir.
1988) (“[T]he fact that an expert’s testimony may be tentative or even speculative does not
mean that the testimony must be excluded so long as opposing counsel has an opportunity
to attack the expert’s credibility.”).
203. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (noting that evidence about the phases of the moon
may be valid for one purpose, but not for another purpose). Federal Jury Instructions regarding expert witness opinion evidence also give explicit directions to the jury regarding
expert testimony: “You may accept or reject it, and give it as much weight as you think it
deserves, considering the witness’s education and experience, the soundness of the reasons
given for the opinion, the acceptability of the methods used, and all the other evidence in
the case.” Criminal Jury Instructions for the Eighth Circuit.
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der Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) if “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury” to reach a different conclusion;204 a judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) if the jury has been unduly swayed by
the questionable expert testimony;205 in some cases, remittitur;206 and
possibly even some form of “statutory gatekeeping.”207
VII. CONCLUSION
No one wants the charlatan expert in the courtroom, but lumping
all experts together—be they scientific or nonscientific—under the
Daubert regime of reliability has enormous potential for causing considerable chaos in the federal courts. Kumho fails to provide any consistent methodology as to when, where, and how to employ Daubert
factors to nonscientific testimony, and the genuine likelihood exists
that different federal trial courts in different jurisdictions will resolve similar matters involving the same nonscientific expert testimony in diametrically opposed ways. As applied, Kumho seems to
work best with nonscientific expert evidence with scientific underpinnings, while it appears to work least well with nonscientific expert evidence based purely on experience. Inconsistent processes will
surely yield inconsistent results.
Furthermore, the very nature of nonscientific expert testimony,
which is based on personal experience, observations, skills, training,
204. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). The Daubert Court recognized this procedure, known as “directed verdict” before the 1991 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as an
appropriate method for dealing with questionable expert testimony: “[I]n the event the
trial court concludes that the scintilla of evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is true,
the court remains free to direct a judgment . . . .” 509 U.S. at 596.
205. Id.
206. In Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 574 F. Supp. 1407 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
for example, the jury was unduly swayed by an expert economist’s testimony that, in retrospect, should not have been admitted into evidence. The district judge thus offered remittitur. Id. at 1414.
207. Some form of “statutory gatekeeping” seems better than arbitrary and inconsistent application of factors by judges in the different jurisdictions to the same or similar experts. The Florida Legislature, for example, has enacted special limitations on the qualifications of experts in medical malpractice actions. Section 766.102(2)(c)2, Florida Statutes,
provides that an expert who is not a similar health care provider may testify to the appropriate standard of care in medical malpractice actions when the expert is qualified “as a
result of practice or teaching in the specialty of the defendant or practice or teaching in a
related field of medicine . . . within the 5-year period before the incident giving rise to the
claim.” Id.
In actions for damages involving a claim of negligence in providing emergency medical
services, section 766.102(6)(a), Florida Statutes, limits the expert testimony from persons
“who have had substantial professional experience within the preceding 5 years while assigned to provide emergency medical services in a hospital emergency department.” It is
conceivable, however, similar “statutory gatekeeping” criteria could be developed for the
more common types of nonscientific expert testimony—yielding more predictability and
consistency in the admission of such testimony. Id.
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etc.—and not on complex scientific principles—makes it more conducive to evaluation by the jury. However, the newly assumed role as
“gatekeeper” for nonscientific expert testimony means more trial review and undoubtedly more exclusions—leaving the jury with less information and coming dangerously close to infringing upon the traditional and constitutional obligation of the jury as the sole trier of
fact. With precious little guidance provided to the gatekeepers regarding admissibility of nonscientific evidence, what may be good for
scientific expert testimony may not necessarily be good for nonscientific expert testimony.

